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The Path of European Football. A Level  
Playing Field for only 90 Minutes  
Katharina Barsch 
Abstract: »Der Pfad des europäischen Fußballs. Ein gerechtes Spiel für lediglich 
90 Minuten«. Football in Europe has an apparent trend towards unfairness. This 
contribution takes a coherent theoretical approach to explain this trend. On 
that account, it creates a framework on the special characteristics of sport and, 
in that light, evaluates interventions by European institutions concerning the 
governance of European football. In a next step, reproductive mechanisms in-
herent to path dependent processes will be specified within a multi-layered an-
alytical framework. It will be shown that these mechanisms are interspersed 
throughout the system of European football and foster the trend of unfairness 
in regard to the relationships between success, money, and power. Empirically 
statistical evidence will show that football clubs within leagues, on an interna-
tional level, as well as leagues in comparison to each other are drifting apart in 
terms of success. Furthermore, an additional qualitative approach will shed 
light on the mechanisms concerning power and how these influence the rules 
of the game on an organizational level. All in all it, will be demonstrated that 
path dependence is inherent to European football and that the European Union 
has interfered unguidedly in the system of football triggering consequences 
contrary to its vision of sport. 
Keywords: Football, path dependence, reproductive mechanisms, European Union, 
Champions League, fairness, success. 
1.  Institutionalized Winning Streaks?1 
The beauty of Cup football is that Jack always has a chance of beating Goliath.  
Terry Butcher 
Despite Butcher’s lack of biblical knowledge, it can be questioned if his com-
ment’s validity exceeds the scope of a single match. Even though the rules on the 
field are the same for all contestants, it is apparent that European club football is 
                                                             
  Katharina Barsch, Department of Political Science, University of Basel, Bernoullistrasse 
14/16, 4056 Basel, Switzerland; ka_ba@gmx.de. 
1  Many thanks go to Johannes Marx for his continuous support and input from the first ideas 
up to this contribution. I would also like to thank those at the University of Bamberg and 
the ETH Zurich who gave their remarks in various settings, and especially Stefanie Bailer and 
Frank Schimmelfennig for their comments and a valuable lesson. 
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dominated by a relatively small number of elite clubs. In that light, this contriu-
tion investigates path-dependent mechanisms in European football responsible 
for a growing gap of success between clubs and leagues on the continent. 
The empirical puzzle at hand is thus quite simple: Why do some clubs have 
the capability to play constantly on a higher level than others? This puzzle is 
far from being new and has been addressed by many scientists. However, sport 
economists who investigated the matter using abstract economic models2 have 
failed to include political structures or real mechanisms; and wherever social 
scientists have entered the field,3 their deliberations are missing theoretical 
approaches that could generate explanatory power. 
As will be shown in this contribution, European football has intrinsic market 
features governed by national and international institutions. Especially in Europe, 
though, these features are also subject to the European Union (EU). Therefore, 
theories and methods of political science are the perfect tools to tackle the matter 
at hand starting briefly on a normative level to then consider the European regula-
tive status quo. Both aspects frequently raise questions or demands towards polit-
ical actors to find a regulative approach to guarantee fairness in this socially 
relevant domain. 
Following those market features, the intuitive answer to the puzzle is as 
simple as the question: The more money you have, the more successful you 
will be. For several reasons, though, this common-sense argument is in need of 
further investigation. Firstly, as Duncan Watts makes the case, “everything is 
obvious once you know the answer” (2011); and secondly, on a similar point, 
Coleman argues that an “explanation is satisfactory if it is useful for the partic-
ular kinds of intervention for which it is intended” (1994, 5). The latter draws 
the line back to the argument outlined above that demands for intervention in 
the system of football are ubiquitous. 
The relationship between money and success, however, works in both ways: 
through a mediator, then the increase of a variable leads to an increase of the 
same variable. Concerning success, the key element of path dependence thus is 
met (see Ackermann 1999, 13). 
The central thesis of this contribution therefore is: Path-dependent mecha-
nisms in European football lead to an ever growing gap of success between 
European clubs. The main objective thereby is to specify those mechanisms in 
                                                             
2  Examples are models concerning competitive balance (Szymanski 2007; Vrooman 2007) or 
the liberalization of markets (Késenne 2007). A more recent approach was taken by Haan, 
Koning and van Witteloostuijn (2012), who analyze the effects of the changes in the system 
on the transfer market. Again, though, this is a study based on abstract models with unreal-
istic assumptions. 
3  One of the most recent attempts was made by Niemann, García and Grant (2012). Even 
though they are thorough in detail, their elaborations are merely descriptive. However, they 
do give valid reason for the quest at hand as shown, for example, by Hill (2012) in the same 
edition. 
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detail and, at the same time, map out angles which show possibilities to tackle 
those mechanisms. 
On that account, I will first provide a brief overview of the particularities of 
sports and embed it in the political sphere of the EU. It will become clear that 
the EU has interfered so far rather unguidedly into European football, changing 
the rules of the game without clear objectives and blindly concerning its deci-
sions’ consequences on a broader scale. This section will illustrate why it is 
important to map out “unfair” mechanisms in European football. Political deci-
sion-makers are to be equipped with the knowledge of football governance to 
be able to effectively formulate rules, ensuring the achievement of policy goals 
for the whole system without unwanted side effects. 
In the second step, the theoretical foundation will be laid. In that endeavor, 
the path-dependence approach will be narrowed down and specified. After-
wards, path dependence will be applied to the matter at hand, mapping out 
where path-dependent mechanisms are at work in European football. 
I will then present statistical evidence in favor of my hypotheses. I will use the 
German 1. Bundesliga (BL) as an example for national leagues, and data on the 
Champions League (CL)4 will be analyzed as well. It will become clear that there 
are at least no contradictory findings lending theory and application credence. 
A qualitative approach will constitute the chapter before the conclusion. I will 
analyze a case in respect to power and politics in European football to get a more 
detailed view on one of the mechanism in European football. 
2.  The Idea of Fairness and Why Sport is Special 
Some people think football is a matter of life and death. I assure you,  
it’s much more serious than that.  
Bill Shankly  
The word “fairness” is used frequently in everyday life and synonymously 
holds as a criterion by which institutional arrangements in society are evaluat-
ed. Connected to sports, however, it unfolds a far greater semantic scope lead-
ing from intrinsic moral properties and educational benefits to solving collec-
tive action problems. I will thus give a brief overview over the arguments along 
this path leading up to aspects of actors unique to sports. 
The intrinsic moral properties of sports are derived from John Rawls’s theo-
ry of justice (1971). The guiding principle in sports thus has to be pure proce-
dural justice, meaning that “[t]he idea of fairness is to design a system which 
                                                             
4  Due to the scope of this paper, other European competition will not be taken into account. 
However, those competitions are subject to the same system and share the same mecha-
nism. Since the Champions League is the most prestigious tournament and generates the 
highest revenues, it is feasible to concentrate on this particular competition. 
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insures, as nearly as possible, that the outcome of the game is just whatever it 
happens to be” (Keenan 1975, 116). In general, this is guaranteed by an impartial 
referee who enforces rules to which all contestants must equally oblige. However, 
justice and thus fairness has also to be rooted in external rules following the 
notion that “[t]he development, regulation, administration, and enforcement of a 
system of rules designed to establish and maintain justice for the institution of 
sport is essential to fairness” (Keenan 1975, 116). To achieve actual fairness, it 
is thus a necessity that not only the immediate rules on the field are impartial, 
but that also the organizational circumstances follow principles of justice. 
These principles of fairness are actually what the founding fathers of foot-
ball associations had in mind for their sports. The Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA) clearly states that the goals of organized football in Eu-
rope are to “ensure that sporting values always prevail over commercial inter-
ests” and to “redistribute revenue generated by football in accordance with the 
principle of solidarity” (UEFA Statutes, Article 2f, g). 
In any case, there is no reason to exempt sports and European football from 
the societal values of fairness in general regarding equal opportunities and 
impartiality. This boils down to the notion that “fairness in sports does not refer 
to the moral behavior of the contestants but rather to structurally given condi-
tions that govern the realm of competitive sports” (Pawlenka 2012, 57). 
The idea of fairness in sports as well as in society connects the dots between 
moral properties and educational efforts. Sport, more often than other aspects of 
life, gives people the opportunity to exercise noble behavior. In the development 
of a moral character, sports is valuable “in so far as such admired human qualities 
as loyalty, courage and resolution are cultivated and directed to uphold what is 
fair and just and in the interest of all” (Arnold 1997, 50). The coherence between 
fairness in society and fairness in sports thus can foster the development of con-
structive citizenship, and gives another reason why the structural surroundings 
in the system of sport – and especially football in Europe as the most popular 
sport – should be guided by fairness. On top of this, most democratic societies 
can agree on a common denominator in regard to the concept of equal oppor-
tunity. As will be shown in this contribution, this principle is violated when it 
comes to the governance of European football. 
Lastly, one can make an argument for fair governing institutions in sports by 
looking at the collective action problem that lies beneath it. European football in 
essence resembles a market with a common product – the leagues – which is only 
marketable through cooperation (Symanski 2007, 367). From an economic point 
of view, clubs are interested in a league being as equalized as possible since it 
generates more revenues by an uncertainty of outcome (Vrooman 2009, 2). In 
other words: 
The firms in a perfectly competitive industry […] have a common interest in a 
higher price for the industry’s product. Since a uniform price must prevail in 
such a market, a firm cannot expect a higher price for itself unless all of the 
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other firms in the industry also have this higher price. But a firm in a competi-
tive market also has an interest in selling as much as it can, until the cost of 
producing another unit exceeds the price of that unit (Olson 1971, 9). 
Clubs, like firms, are interested in a leveled competition as they still want to 
win as many matches as possible. But since clubs are win-maximizers and not 
profit-maximizers,5 the cost of a win cannot exceed its benefits because reve-
nues and success in football are incommensurable, making an economic equi-
librium impossible, and calling for some kind of governance. 
The collective action problem arises when it comes to revenues generated by 
the league. In contrast to the classical problem where those who do not partici-
pate in producing a collective good cannot be detained from using it (Olson 
1971, 14 et seq.), in football, not all of those who participate in producing the 
collective good – the league – can profit from it in the same manner. In this 
sense, the issue is a mirrored collective action problem. At the end of the day, 
this means also for football: “Creating conditions favorable to collective action 
is a principal issue in political life” (Pierson 2000, 258), and in this context to 
channel the diverse interests between clubs themselves and between clubs and 
the sporting body of the league. 
3.  The “EUropean Case” of Interfering Institutions 
Please don’t call me arrogant, but I’m European champion and I think  
I’m a special one.  
José Mourinho 
This chapter elaborates on the special role of sports and how they are reflected 
in the political behavior of the EU. It will demonstrate how the lack of coherent 
political dimensions has caused a rift between political ambitions and judicial 
practice in European football. 
The regulatory involvement of the EU when it comes to the matter of sports 
– and in this case specifically football – can be divided in two categories: 
measures to formulate policy goals and distinguish competences in treaties and 
soft law on the one hand, and judicial decisions on the other. I will give an over-
                                                             
5  Rodney Fort, in reference to Sloane (1971 quoted in Cairns, Jennett and Sloane 1985), 
summarizes that “[w]ith few notable exceptions, there is nothing more pervasive in the lit-
erature on European sports than the idea that teams do not pursue profit” (2000, 439). 
Concerning European football, this argument is developed further by recognizing vertical 
competitive structures and empirical evidence in the form that “analysts of team account-
ing statements report that there are no profits to be found” (2000, 440). This assessment is 
shared by many other authors. Késenne, for example, states that a “certain profit rate can 
be necessary to satisfy owners or the shareholders of the club, or to invest in a new stadi-
um,” but it is certainly not the primary preference (2006, 417 et seq.). 
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view of relevant or exemplary cases for European football6 in those categories to 
then extrapolate issues of sports governance concerning football. 
Sport, in general, has not been on the EU’s agenda for a long time. The first 
careful introduction of sports into the European treaty framework was the dec-
laration on sport in the treaty of Amsterdam,7 which generally refers to the 
special role of sport for society, and the fact that sporting rules may have to be 
evaluated by different standards than other fields of societal interaction. This 
was followed by the “Nice declaration” which, amongst other things, recog-
nized that “[s]porting federations have a key role to play in ensuring the neces-
sary solidarity between the various levels of sporting practice, from recreation-
al to top-level sport” (European Commission 2000). The declaration also spe-
specifically caught up with decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
regards to European football concerning, for example, the Bosman verdict, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter, stating: 
As far as the system of transfers is concerned, in particular in football, the Eu-
ropean Council strongly supports the dialogue between the sporting move-
ment, the organizations representing professional sportsmen and sportswom-
en, the Community and the Member States. This dialogue concerns the 
development of the transfer system, especially in football, in order to take ac-
count of, among other things, the principle of freedom of movement for work-
ers. The current system of transfers in professional football is being carefully 
examined by the Commission in the light of the rules on both competition and 
freedom of movement.  
What should be kept in mind about this declaration is its emphasis on values 
like solidarity while at the same time connecting sporting regulations to Euro-
pean laws on competition or the freedom of movement of workers. 
The next milestone on the role of sport for and in the EU is the Commis-
sion’s White Paper on Sport in 2007, in which specific goals are formulated 
concerning sport in Europe. Again the Commission pays special attention to 
football being the most popular and economically strongest field of sport in 
Europe (European Commission 2007, 17). Here again, values like solidarity are 
specifically promoted: 
The Commission recommends to sport organizations to pay due attention to 
the creation and maintenance of solidarity mechanisms. In the area of sports 
media rights, such mechanisms can take the form of a system of collective 
selling of media rights or, alternatively, of a system of individual selling by 
clubs, in both cases linked to a robust solidarity mechanism.  
                                                             
6  For a detailed overview on EU interference in sport, see Budzinski (2012). 
7  “The Conference emphasizes the social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging 
identity and bringing people together. The Conference therefore calls on the bodies of the 
European Union to listen to sports associations when important questions affecting sport 
are at issue. In this connection, special consideration should be given to the particular char-
acteristics of amateur sport.” 
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In this line, the Commission accepted the special characteristics of sports on 
four dimensions: The dependence of sporting actors of each other, the need for 
competitive balance8 including the “sufficient sporting and economic viability of 
the competitors,” “the freedom of internal organization of sport associations,” and 
“the ‘principle of solidarity’ [… as] a somewhat non-economic community objec-
tive” (Budzinski 2012, 47 et seq.). This reflects the normative arguments as well 
as the collective action problem made at the beginning of this chapter. 
The most import development so far, though, was the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009. It ended the long-lasting struggle by sport associations for full organiza-
tional autonomy outside of European law by placing sport specifically inside 
the realm of European treaties (Weatherhill 2011, 10). This concluded a period 
in which “the institutions of the EU have offered periodically inconsistent 
explanations of how and why sport is special” leading to a “framework for 
future debate, policy articulation and litigation” relating to the special charac-
teristic of sport as stated above. However, the treaty is far from specifying 
bulletproof rules and division of competences between sport associations and 
the EU, or even between different EU institutions (Wetherhill 2011, 12 et seq.). 
After this overview on the policy space in Europe, I will now turn to judicial 
decisions and their ramifications in relation to the European view on sport. As 
mentioned earlier, quite a number of the formulations in the treaties or by other 
institutions do not set the arena for sports but merely catch up on decisions 
already made by the ECJ, an aspect worthy of special consideration. 
The so-called Bosman Verdict by the ECJ is considered as the most shaking 
external influence on European football in modern times (see Hinzpeter 2000, 
76). The verdict had a deep impact on nationality clauses within national 
leagues, as well as on the rules for the transfer market for players. Nationality 
clauses initially were within national leagues’ realm of competence but were 
also steadily discussed on the European level (see Thomé 2003, 157 et seq.). 
Then in 1992, the 3+2-rule9 constituted a uniform regulation for European 
leagues. Up until that point, the rules for the transfer market – especially trans-
fer fees –had been rooted in English football traditions and were incorporated 
into the European system quite early (Dinkelmeier 1999, 20 et seq.). 
The whole controversy was joined by European institutions during the 
1970s. Even though the EC Commission took part in the discussions, it was the 
ECJ that generally placed professional sports within the jurisdiction of Europe-
an treaties (Lee 1995, 1288). 
                                                             
8  Competitive balance as a term defines the spread of success in a competition. A high bal-
ance means that results are close due to relatively equal opponents. 
9  The rule constitutes that a maximum of three foreign players shall be involved in a club’s 
game. In addition two more foreign players could be on the field if those fulfilled special 
criteria (Grodde 2007, 47). 
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In 1990, Jean-Marc Bosman made his way through judicial institution main-
ly because of his dissatisfaction with the fact that, even after a contract had 
ended, clubs could still demand transfer fees from potential future employers 
(Dinkelmeier 1999, 21). The Belgian player wanted to transfer to the French 
club Dunkerque after his contract with RC Liège had ended. The latter, howev-
er, demanded a transfer fee of 300,000 Euros (Thomé 2003, 159). However, 
since there were doubts about the financial stability of Dunkerque, the already 
negotiated contract failed and Bosman started his journey through judicial 
institutions on the basis of a violation of the freedom of movement for workers 
(Mittag 2007, 207). 
The verdict by the ECJ was rendered on the 15th of December 1995 and 
lead to the abolition of previously established rules. The judges made clear that 
neither transfer fees nor nationality clauses are in line with the freedom of 
movement for workers, and thus violate European treaties. Since no periods of 
transition were granted, the rules on the transfer market changed immediately 
and players were now able to find new employment independently after their 
contracts ended (Mittag 2007, 208). The 3+2 rule needed a year longer, but was 
cancelled without substitution by the UEFA in 1996. 
The verdict however left European football with a rather unique attribute: 
Using a market analogy, the market for production goods was now fully liber-
alized and integrated in Europe, while the market for the product was not. In 
other words, clubs could now employ as many foreign players without major 
restrictions as they wished, but each club was still bound to its national league. 
The comments about the transfer system of European football in the Nice 
declaration are based on the Bosman Verdict. But more importantly, the verdict 
is a major contributor to inequality between national leagues and thus between 
clubs in the CL, as will be shown later in this contribution. It is thus a contra-
diction to the general moral view the EU took on football and sports. This 
contradiction is mainly rooted in the different applications of EU law. Since the 
political sphere became active far after the ECJ judicial decisions were made 
under competition law or European pillars like the freedom of movement of 
workers. These regulations, however, took no consideration of the special 
characteristics of football. The consequences of their impact are thus undi-
rected and can undermine the overall vision the EU has for sport nowadays, 
like it is the case with the Bosman Verdict. 
Another important issue that has frequently lead to interaction between 
football associations and EU institutions is the selling of broadcasting rights. 
The Commission even goes as far as stating that “[c]ompetition in the markets 
for the sale of TV rights of football events is one of the Commission’s priori-
ties” (European Commission 2003, 47). For football associations, this matter is 
traditionally very sensitive since the central marketing of rights to a whole 
competition brings obvious monopolistic advantages when it comes to prices, 
which in turn football associations see as a right in terms of their sporting au-
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tonomy. The Commission, however, declared the joint selling of broadcasting 
rights for sporting events as a violation of article 101 of The Treaty on Europe-
an Union. The UEFA addressed the commission with the argument that joint 
selling is necessary to redistribute revenues according to the principle of soli-
darity between the clubs opting for an exception. The Commission, however, 
did not follow this argument. Instead, the European institution and the football 
authority on the continent entered into negotiations. In a new approach, the 
UEFA proposed a slightly changed system in terms of more diversity of pur-
chasing opportunities. That proposal basically left the central selling marketing 
untouched, but changed the method of joint selling which was for the Commis-
sion a good enough compromise at that point (Holtz-Bacha 2006, 84 et seq.), 
which is due to the fact that in general the Commission did not see itself as a 
“sports competition policy regulator” (Brand and Niemann 2011, 8). 
A similar case occurred shortly after in 2003, this time concerning central 
marketing and joint selling in the German Bundesliga. The responsible sporting 
body – the Deutsche Fußball Liga (DFL) – reacted very much the same way as 
the UEFA so that in 2005 the case was closed with the DFL making similar 
concessions as the UEFA did just two years earlier. Borussia Dortmund’s man-
aging director at the time Dr. Christian Hockenjos summarized the outcome as 
follows: “The new model [… is] ‘essentially a centralized system of marketing 
broadcasting rights with some decentralized elements on the fringes’” (Brand 
and Niemann 2011, 10). 
In both cases the joint selling methods underwent changes. The central mar-
keting aspect, however, somewhat faded out of the negotiations. The Commis-
sion’s report on the UEFA case for example does not even mention this aspect 
but concentrates on the positive consequences for competition made by the 
adjusted joint selling methods (see European Commission 2003). This leaves 
central marketing in a political vacuum especially concerning the ambiguity of 
interests between clubs and leagues in reference to the collective action prob-
lem. Since the Commission based its arguments not on the special characteris-
tics of sports – namely the principle of solidarity – but on competition law it is 
questionable if the agreements would withstand a challenge before the ECJ, 
rendering the issues to a certain degree of uncertainty. 
In summary the EU has developed a rather clear idea of the role of sport and 
the values it is supposed to promote. However, when it comes to specific issues, 
like the transfer market in European football for example, also an attempt to 
incorporate previous ECJ rulings was being made even though the consequences 
of those rulings might contradict the recently before formed vision on sport. In 
addition, some of the soft laws or the Lisbon treaty still leave the policy field in 
some sort of “fuzziness” since the practice on the application of either the special 
characteristics of sport or “conventional” European law is still rather indistinct. I 
will demonstrate in the process of this contribution that the Bosman-Verdict as 
well as the decisions – or non-decisions – regarding the central marketing 
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strengthen path dependent mechanisms on the road to unfairness. If the EU is 
serious about its vision on sport, a solution to football’s independent problems of 
unfairness and to problems in relation to existing EU interventions has to be 
found within the EU context since football is deeply integrated on the European 
continent and already affected by EU decisions. This contribution thus contrib-
utes to that solution by putting the most important sport in Europe and its de-
velopment into an analytical framework mapping out the mechanisms which 
lead to a state in contradiction to the European vision on sport. 
4.  Analytical Framework 
Football is like chess, only without the dice.  
Lukas Podolski 
The baseline for the theoretical approach is an empty explanatory macro-micro 
model based on Coleman’s Boat (1994, 8) allowing for the idea of reproductive 
mechanism. This model looks as follows: 
Figure 1: Coleman's Boat on a Path 
 
 
The main actors for the quest at hand are European football clubs. They are the 
driving force behind all developments within the system of football. This also 
accounts for various football institutions since inevitably they are constituted, 
even if through several levels, of clubs. 
As for preferences within the approach of path dependence, there is a lively 
debate between various hyphen-institutionalists of whether preferences precede 
or follow institutions. This question has obvious implication for any theory 
building. I, however, will follow Kathleen Thelen, making the point “that the 
move from general propositions about what political actors are seeking to max-
imize inevitably brings the theorist face to face with the question of what it 
means to, say, maximize power within a given context” (1999, 376). As elabo-
rated earlier, the main objective of clubs is simply to win. 
It is the first arrow from the macro to the micro level that accounts for the 
“given context” stated by Thelen. Or, in other words, it “mirrors[s …] all those 
elements that establish the conditions for [an actor]” (Coleman 1994, 11). 
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This then leads to the elements of choice for which again Coleman gives a 
simple enough concept: “The elements are actors and things over which they 
have control and in which they have some interest. I will call these things re-
sources […]. The relations between actors and resources are, as just implied, 
control and interest” (1994, 28). Thus, the main theoretical question is how 
clubs gain resources and how they allocate them to maximize their utilities 
meaning winning as much as possible. 
When it comes to creating revenues a number of other actors are involved. 
These are summarized in the following table: 
Table 1: Actors and Roles 
Actor Type Role 
Institutions as collective 
entity of clubs  Collective 
Redistributing collective revenues and setting 
the meta-rules of the game 
Direct investors  Individual Companies financing clubs through advertise-ment 
Indirect investors  Individual Fans supporting clubs 
5.  Path Dependence 
When you are 4-0 up you should never lose 7-1.  
Lawrie McMenemy 
Path dependence in general describes the stability of an economic or institu-
tional process.10 The formation of a path thereby consists of a mechanism of 
production and a mechanism of reproduction (Schwartz 2004, 1). The mecha-
nism of production explaining the occurrence of a certain setting and the mecha-
nism of reproduction explaining the consistency in the direction that setting pro-
gress (Schwartz 2004, 11). However, the mechanism of production should hardly 
be called a mechanism within the theoretical approach. Hedström’s and Yli-
koski’s example of a roulette table is quite good to exemplify this point. In their 
illustration, they point out that the mechanism of the roulette wheel remains the 
same, even if the outcomes differ within their characteristics (2010, 50). In this 
sense, the mechanism of reproduction – for now strictly seen as just any mecha-
nism – would be resembled by the roulette wheel. The setting would be the rou-
lette table as such. The mechanism of production hence would be the explanation 
of how the table came to be in its specific state. This might as well be explainable 
by a mechanism, but the approach of path dependency does not provide general-
                                                             
10  Another approach also under the label of path dependence is the idea of “reactive sequenc-
es” (Mahoney 2000, 509). However it postulates a sequence of causally linked events in ab-
sence of distinct mechanisms which is irreconcilable with the basic arguments of path de-
pendence. 
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izable theoretical arguments for settings. Therefore, a mechanism of production 
is to be neglected as an explanatory part of the theoretical superstructure con-
cerning path stability. Rather, the setting is to be considered as “all those ele-
ments that establish the conditions for a player’s action,” as Coleman defines the 
context of a game or his first step concerning his boat (1994, 11).To stay in the 
analogy of roulette, this means that the distribution of numbers and colors and 
their payoffs influence where a player puts his money though it does not change 
the mechanism by which the number – spinning the wheel – is determined.11 
The key element of path dependence thus is the mechanism of reproduction. 
Paul A. David (1986) and Brian W. Arthur (1994) have laid the groundwork for 
these mechanisms. However, there is good reason why so far it is called the path 
dependence “approach.” A coherent theory is still to be developed. 
The first appearance of path dependence was given by David in the context 
of him explaining the success of the QWERTY keyboard.12 David shows that, 
contrary to neo-classical theory, an inefficient product can dominate the mar-
ket. He argues that three aspects are responsible for that phenomenon of stable 
path to success: technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and quasi-
irreversibility (1986, 41). Brian W. Arthur then introduced the term of “self-
reinforcement” that further develops David’s economies-of-scale argument 
(Beyer 2005, 8). In that sense, Arthur provides more detailed aspects that lead 
to stable paths: Large set up or fixed costs, learning effects, coordination ef-
fects and self-reinforcing expectations. 
Within the literature of political or economic science, the term “increasing 
returns” is usually used to summarize Arthur’s criteria (see Pierson 2000, 254; 
Beyer 2005, 7) regarding path dependency. At times, “positive feedback” is 
also used as a synonym (see Pierson 2000, 263; Ebbinghaus 2005, 15). Howev-
er, for path-dependent processes, David’s arguments are also important and the 
lack of clear distinctions calls for precise definitions. Table 2 gives those clear 
definitions.13 The pure meanings thereby are borrowed from Scott Page’s 
mathematical approach towards path dependence (2006, 88). In addition to 
that, I matched David’s and Arthur’s aspects with those definitions showing 
how different actors’ costs (c) and utilities (u) are influenced. 
  
                                                             
11  Ebbinghaus (2005) gives a detailed description of the mechanism of production but fails to 
address the analytical problems within the path dependence approach. 
12  “QWERTY” refers to the arrangement of letters on conventionally used keyboards. 
13  This becomes particularly clear by looking at the work of Mahoney, for example, who found 
several more mechanisms (2000, 517), or Beyer (2005, 18) which turned out to be new la-
bels in different contexts for the mechanisms expressed by Arthur and David. 
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Table 2: Mechanisms of Path Dependence 
Mechanism Definition Meso-Level (collective actors) 
Micro-Level 
(individual actors) 
Increasing 
Returns  
“the more a choice is 
made or an action is 
taken, the greater its 
benefits.” 
Large set up or 
fixed costs (c↓)  
Self-
Reinforcement 
“making a choice or 
taking an action puts in 
place a set of forces or 
complementary institu-
tions that encourage 
that choice to be sus-
tained.” 
Learning effects 
(c↓), 
Coordination 
effects (u↑) 
Intra-personal exter-
nalities: Technical 
interrelatedness (u↑), 
Quasi-irreversibility 
(c=0) 
Positive 
Feedback  
“an action or choice 
creates positive exter-
nalities when that same 
choice is made by other 
people.” 
 
Interpersonal external-
ities (u↑), 
Self-reinforcing 
expectations (u(↑)) 
 
Economically speaking, ‘increasing returns’ means that, with a higher number 
of units, the costs of production decrease (Beyer 2005, 7). So, the more indi-
viduals take a particular path, the more beneficial it becomes for the collective 
actor. A collective actor in this case could be a company but also an institution 
(Pierson 2000, 254). 
Self-reinforcement occurs on the meso- and on the micro-level. Learning ef-
fects relate to the improvement of a product or institution or to the development 
of more efficient operating cycles (Arthur 1994, 112). Coordination effects 
emerge when different economic or institutional actors take choices that benefit 
the respectively other actor’s choice or action (Beyer 2005, 7). On the level of 
individual actors – in the original sense, these would be customers – self-
reinforcement is fostered by intra-personal externalities (Page 2006, 110). These 
cover David’s arguments of technical interrelatedness and quasi-irreversibility: 
The first meaning, that individual components of a system are compatible and, 
if used together, increase the value of each part (David 1986, 41 et seq.). This 
can either happen independently or through the coordination effect on a higher 
level. Quasi-irreversibility arises when switching to a choice or action previ-
ously not taken is connected to high costs (David 1986, 45). 
Positive feedback is, on the one hand, described by “little bonuses given to 
people who already made [a] choice or who will make that choice in the future” 
(Page 2006, 88). Self-reinforcing expectations are closely related to those in-
terpersonal externalities in the sense that “increased prevalence on the market 
enhances beliefs of further prevalence” (Arthur 1994, 112), therefore shaping 
incentives to make a particular choice or action. 
For path-dependent mechanisms on the individual level, it is important that 
the actor himself does not consider the systemic implication of his action. If 
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that was the case, one could argue that the individual actor is trying to steer 
fate. If a large enough amount of actors consciously try to affect a systemic 
factor, any outcome would not be path dependent but changed by the actual 
will for it. 
Translating this into the original empty model incorporating path depend-
ence transforms the model as depicted in the next figure. 
Figure 2: Coleman's Boat on a Path 2.0 
 
 
First of all, the meso-level was put in. This accounts for different levels of 
actors. It is important, however, that the collective actor is not necessarily the 
accumulation of individual actors in the same model. Instead in reference to the 
origin of the theory the individual actor would be the customers while the col-
lective actor would be a company. In a political context, though, the individual 
could be a citizen and the collective actor an organization. As for the model 
both levels are influenced by the same setting and both their actions are rele-
vant for producing a new setting. 
The new setting is the aggregation of all actions. Coleman gives various 
ways of how actions can aggregate in- or interdependently (1994, 29 et seq.). 
However, in the case of path dependence, this is where reproductive mechanisms 
enter the field. The actions aggregate into a new setting in which the condition for 
the same actions are even more favorable or cost-effective due to reproductive 
mechanisms than they were for the previous choice. So, actors will make the 
same choice, again elevating path dependence even further. This is basically 
analogous to Coleman’s description of the second transition (here called aggrega-
tion): “The second transition is mirrored by the consequences of the player’s 
action [...] creating a new context within the next action takes place” (1994, 12). 
The difference though being, that, through reproductive mechanisms, not any 
new setting will arise, but one that is another step on a stable path. 
Theoretically, this could go on indefinitely; however, it is hard to imagine 
any context where there is no threshold value. In terms of football, for example, 
that threshold would be one club always winning everything, or in economic 
terms, an absolute monopoly on the market. 
Once a path is stabilized by reproductive mechanisms, only exogenous 
chocks can interrupt its heading (Beyer 2005, 7). Basically, the setting has to be 
changed by an outside factor changing one or more elements of choice. 
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6.  The Path of European Football 
Mind you, I’ve been here during the bad times too – one year we came second.  
Bob Paisley 
In the following, I will first make a few comments about the applicability of 
path dependence in European football. I will then map out where mechanisms 
of reproduction are to be found in football. Indeed, it will become clear that any 
aspect of the sport is susceptible to path dependence in terms of successful 
clubs becoming more successful. Thus, there are no internal counter mecha-
nisms that could change the system from within, making a political intervention 
all so more necessary. 
The main aspects that generate money in football are selling game tickets, 
hospitality in stadiums, the club as its own brand including merchandise, adver-
tisements, and media rights, as well as revenues from transferring players 
(Friedrichsen and Löhe 2007, 255 et seq.). All these aspects are purely eco-
nomical and therefore path dependence is applicable. 
Slightly different is the market of success. A league is indeed a market of 
success. Within a league, clubs as win-maximizers try to maximize their share 
in the market of success. The differences to a conventional market are three-
fold. First of all, clubs cannot produce success. However, they try to ensemble 
the best production means to generate success (Késenne 2006, 417). Secondly, 
market shares strictly within the league without exogenous variables are not 
dependent on consumers. However, as consumers have criteria to choose between 
different products – consciously or subconsciously –, the market of success has 
objective criteria by which the better product is determined. Essentially, this 
makes it even easier to grasp market dynamics analytically. And thirdly, also the 
overall volume of the market is not determined by customers; the market is pre-
structured, setting a certain set of “purchasing decisions.” 
The collective-action argument outlined above demonstrated why institu-
tions are necessary. At the end of the day, “[t]here would [...] be no point in 
forming an organization simply to play solitaire” (Olson 1971, 7). 
In conclusion, this shows that, in football, one must explore three factors all 
vulnerable to path dependent mechanism: conventional economic markets, the 
league as market, and institutions. Or, in other words: money, success, and 
power. 
On these premises, reproductive mechanisms can be evaluated. Thus, to 
transfer path dependence to European football, relevant actors and their behav-
ior within the different markets or institutions have to be examined. Therefore, 
three levels will be included: the “customer” or fan, other economic actors, and 
the clubs. The latter then again has to be divided into two categories: clubs 
within the league and clubs as institutional players. 
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Football fans, especially those who do not support a local team, are prone to 
intra-personal externalities. Once a club, is chosen it is likely that a fan will 
stick to it. So, they will invest their resources in their favored team. Also, as 
will be shown later, if money indeed leads to success, the “little bonuses” occur 
for every old or new fan, which implicates positive feedback. 
This has implications for other economic actors. Increasing returns for eco-
nomic actors are due to the international appearance of clubs. Advertising 
companies develop new markets in line with the large set up costs-argument. 
Also, self-reinforcement can be created through coordination effects between a 
club and a company or brand. Thus, intra-personal externalities also exist for 
advertising partners. For smaller, more local advertisers, again positive feed-
back occurs, as with more success come more advertisers, which leads to more 
money, which in turn brings more success. Important here, however, is that 
those local partners are not in direct competition with each other. 
This means, for clubs as economic actors, that success should lead to more 
money by advertisers or fans spending money on merchandise, tickets, and the 
like. This money is then used by clubs to invest in their infrastructure. The first 
consideration here goes in the direction of economic infrastructure like stadi-
ums. However, even though also these investments can be conquered by repro-
ductive mechanisms, they can be neglected at this point. This is for the simple 
reason that they have rather obvious threshold values which are pretty much the 
same for all clubs and therefore have no impact on the main theses. 
Investments of clubs have to be seen in the light of actually acquiring the el-
ements or resources for potential success. As earlier explained, a club’s main 
goal is winning, and the resource they have control of is money to gather the 
best team possible. Since the number of football players decreases with the 
increase of their talent, clubs are in a competitive market with each other to 
aggregate the most talent on the field.14 So, the more money a club has at hand 
as resources, the better their team will be relative to other teams with fewer 
resources. 
Besides their individual investment, clubs are also institutional actors. This 
is especially relevant, because in the CL and in most national leagues, the mon-
ey generated by television rights is distributed by the responsible football insti-
tutions. Power within those institutions therefore translates into influencing the 
allocation formula of this money. However, football institutions are generally 
democratic. But since there is no natural obligation to be a member of these 
                                                             
14  Working with young talent is slightly different, but also represents an investment on aggre-
gated talent and therefore follows the same line of argument. Also, the mere aggregation of 
talent might not be enough. But when it comes to coaches and support staff, clubs are 
again in a competitive market, which again boils down to an investment-argument of find-
ing the best “production good” to organize the talent. In any case, the “raw material” has to 
be good. 
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institutions, one can find some sort of hypothetical competition of institutions. 
Football clubs have a potential exit option if they find other clubs who would 
be willing to part from the original institution. This would take revenues out of 
the existing institution, giving clubs bargaining power within the institution. 
This power increases with the economic importance of clubs. So the more 
successful a club is, the more it contributes to the collective good, and the 
higher its bargaining power becomes within the system. On top of this “break-
away league” would represent competition for the existing institutions which 
would effectively dissolve their monopoly raising also economic disad-
vantages. Therefore, power within the institutional arena of European football 
is marked by increasing returns. 
A last aspect in the institutional context is the modus in which a competition 
is played or – in case of the CL – also the modus of qualification. Here, the 
same argument as above is valid in terms of power. Therefore, powerful clubs 
have the bargaining power to modify a competition in their favor. 
When it comes to the political arena, clubs might find another potential ally in 
European institutions. As shown in the first paragraph of this contribution, the 
EU’s stand especially in regard to its judicial practice on sport is still rather am-
biguous. Nevertheless, the EU has laid claim to the regulation of sport. The lack 
of coherent and consequent regulations, however, can give clubs the opportunity 
to pursue certain goals outside the sporting associations, circumventing those by 
addressing issues with European political authorities or the ECJ. Especially when 
it comes to aspects of solidarity like e.g. the redistribution of broadcasting reve-
nues, successful clubs might choose to bypass the responsible association by 
referring to competition law on the EU-level. So far, as demonstrated earlier, the 
special characteristics of sport are rarely taken into account. First of all, because 
they are still a rather recent phenomenon, and secondly, because the ECJ has 
already created accomplished facts that undermine the EU’s new-found vision, 
but as a matter of law are being taken into account. In this sense, the EU level at 
the moment, even though not deliberately, can be seen as biased towards success-
ful clubs since the features of a “normal” industry as basis of competition law 
favor the interests of successful clubs. It remains to be seen whether the EU 
develops into a credible counter mechanism. Right now, it enhances the bar-
gaining power of successful clubs by presenting an issues-specific exit option. 
In conclusion, a club’s preference is to win. Therefore, they will use their 
resources – money and power – to make conditions according to that goal as 
favorable as possible up to the threshold of a non-functional system of football 
in terms of collective action. Success, money, and power are thereby related 
through path-dependent mechanisms. On top of which reproductive mecha-
nisms on the levels of fans and other economic actors further the overall path 
dependence of success even more. Hence, the model for a successful club 
would look as follows: 
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Figure 3: Coleman's Boat in European Football 
 
 
This cycle can only be broken by external shocks. As mentioned before, they 
change the elements of choice. In football, this is most likely to be the aspect or 
resources since rich investors can infuse money, accelerating a club onto a 
winning streak like one could see with Chelsea or Hoffenheim.15 
7.   A Model of Reinforcement on Multiple Levels 
Milan or Madrid – the most important thing is it’s Italy. 
Andi Möller 
Four criteria are important to contextualize reproductive mechanisms within 
the European system of football. Those are: revenue potential in national 
leagues, accessibility of production goods, qualifying for the CL, and the inter-
dependence of reproductive mechanisms between the national and the interna-
tional level. 
First of all, just looking at the national level, all the above-stated reproduc-
tive mechanisms are in place. Therefore the first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis I: Successful clubs in a national league become more successful 
over time. 
The same accounts for the CL. Even though it is played in a different modus, 
all mechanisms apply. Therefore the second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis II: Successful clubs in the CL become more successful over time. 
However, not all leagues have the same size. In other words: “If a country like 
Belgium wants to reach the same number of inhabitant per top division team as 
England, it has to reduce the number of its teams to four or five, or to increase 
its birth rate dramatically” (Késenne 2007, 397). Neither aspects are real op-
tions. This would not have a big impact if the market for production goods was 
not liberalized. In European football, the product is bound to its own national 
                                                             
15  Analysing external shocks would be an endeavour for another paper. The cases so far are 
few, which is why this aspect will not be considered further in this contribution. 
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market. In contrast, the market for production goods is open throughout the 
whole world (Késenne 2007, 395). This was cemented by the Bosman Verdict. 
In consequence, European football developed talent-importing and talent-
exporting leagues (Thomé 2003, 161). Mainly because, due to higher chances 
of creating revenues also on an individual level, players have the incentive to 
transfer into bigger leagues. This has two implications for path dependence. First, 
aggregating talent in a league makes the league more attractive, and therefore 
reinforces economic reproductive mechanisms. Secondly, even though buying 
out other leagues might not give a relative advantage within the own league, it 
certainly does so when playing internationally against teams from smaller 
leagues, thus creating increasing returns. Qualifying for the CL is effected by 
reproductive mechanisms in terms of power. Powerful clubs or leagues can shape 
the qualifying rules in a way that participation becomes more likely for them, 
hence promoting a system where bigger leagues are structurally advantaged. 
All those mechanisms are interdependently strengthening and reinforcing 
one another through the levels. This results in the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis III:  European football is subject to an ever growing gap between 
its national leagues in terms of success. 
The following figure illustrates how the hypotheses interact: 
Figure 4: European Football 
 
 
Within the leagues and competitions, successful clubs become more successful 
(HI and HII). Looking at European football combined, all mechanisms further 
the fact that a few successful clubs in big leagues will dominate the sport on the 
continent (HIII). 
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8.   Statistical Evidence 
The chances are currently 50:50 or even 60:60.  
Reiner Calmund 
In the following chapter, I will present descriptive statistical evidence to sup-
port the validity of the hypotheses.16 As an example for a national league I will 
use data on the German 1. Bundesliga. 
The data was collected from the websites of the responsible football associa-
tions, namely the DFL and the UEFA. The data on the BL contains all results 
since its foundation in 1963 to 2014. The data on the CL contains all data from 
the European Cup, which is the predecessor of the CL, since 1955 (also date of 
foundation), and the UEFA Champions League until 2014. 
The important variable in both cases is “success.” Success in the BL is 
measured as the percentage of points gained in a season by a club of the poten-
tial maximum of points that could have been acquired. Since in the league 
every team plays against every other team twice, the gained points relative to 
the maximum show how much a team dominates the league or, on the other 
side, how poorly a team played. The measure is more accurate than simply 
looking at the rankings since it takes into account how much better or worse a 
club was in relation to all the other clubs. 
The CL, in big parts, works differently in comparison to a league. In the K. 
O. system, clubs play against each other and the winner moves on to the next 
level of the competition while losers leave the competition for the season com-
pletely. On top of this, the shape of the tournament changed significantly over 
time concerning the number of participants, the number of rounds, the organi-
zation of the rounds, and starting spots for clubs. It is thus necessary to measure 
success independent of all those factors. Success in the CL is therefore meas-
ured by the number of clubs that a club left behind itself in the competition 
when it reached its highest level in the CL17 divided by the number of clubs 
involved in a particular season. That means if a club for example reaches the 
quarter finals and then leaves the competition, it is hypothetically better then 
every club but those on the same stage and those that move on to the semi-
final. In this case success, would be two divided by the number of participating 
clubs (excluding the particular club). This measure allows for comparability 
taking into account all aspects mentioned above also including those aspects in 
the measure to draw a clear picture of the development of success over time 
within the changing competition. 
                                                             
16  Models to tests the hypotheses on an analytical level would require more data on all European 
leagues and sub-leagues. This endeavour, however, would exceed the scope of this paper. 
17  In detail, it is the number of clubs a club left behind itself plus itself. This creates an index 
that ranges between 0 (no participation) and 1 (Champion). 
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Graph 1 depicts the success of clubs in the German Bundesliga for each sea-
son. The fitted success is an indication that the there is a slight development 
that clubs concentrate more on the bottom of the possible realm of success 
which is a small indicator that it is harder for less successful clubs to keep the 
connection to the top of the league. 
The standard deviation is used as a crude measure of competitive balance. 
The spread of success is an indicator of how close clubs are together in the 
league in terms of success. In a perfectly balanced league, all clubs would only 
play draws and the standard deviation would be zero. The further the clubs drift 
apart from each other the higher the standard deviation. Due to the 3-point 
system in the BL, where a win brings three points and a draw only one, the 
mean differs depending on how many draws are played in a season. With vary-
ing means, it usually would make sense to use the coefficient of variation. 
However, since draws and therefore also the means are a result of the competi-
tive balance, they are theoretically embedded in the standard deviation, making 
the simple standard deviation as coefficient even more expressive. 
Graph 1: Success in the German Bundesliga 
 
 
The fitted line for the standard deviation is of a quadratic form. This accounts 
for the fact that the mechanisms were probably not at work in the beginning of 
the competition since commercialization and organization, aspects that are 
necessary for path dependent mechanisms, only developed during the first 
years of the competition. 
The standard deviation has a trend toward a more unequal league, which 
supports the hypotheses that within a national league, indeed there is a devel-
opment of “unfairness” (Hypothesis 1). However, since it is not apparent yet if 
it is actually the same clubs that are being successful, for the moment this has 
to be viewed critically. 
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Graph 2:  Aggregated Success in the Bundesliga and Champions League 
 
 
In any case, if one adds the success of German clubs in the CL (Graph 2), the 
picture becomes even clearer. The trend regarding success disappears, which is 
mainly due to the fact that, after 1995, always more than one German club took 
part in the CL, creating more “outliers” to the end of the time series. Looking at 
the standard deviation, however, again as a measure of competitive balance, 
demonstrates that the development is stronger taking the international level into 
account. This is in line with the argument that the mechanisms reinforce them-
selves over different levels of competitions. 
Graph 3 depicts the duration a club has spent in the BL after its advance-
ment to the top league before exiting the league due to a lack of success. The 
grey dots show those clubs that are still in the Bundesliga and those who en-
tered in 1963 being the first season of the BL. Again, there is an overall trend 
that the duration of staying in the league after advancement becomes smaller. 
In terms of sociology, this means that lasting social advancement to a higher 
class becomes more difficult. This is evidence for path dependence as lied out 
in theoretical part concerning even getting into the top league and staying there 
to be able to take part in international competition. Overall, the Bundesliga 
becomes more elite, shutting new participants out. Especially since 1995, when 
the impacts of the Bosman Verdict implemented themselves, almost no new 
clubs manage to stay in league for more than five years. 
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Graph 3: Advancement and Duration in the German Bundesliga 
 
 
Lastly, as for the Bundesliga, Graphs 4 and 5 show successful clubs to evaluate 
if the trend is random regarding particular clubs, or if indeed the same clubs 
always win. Graph 4 shows clubs that exceed the benchmark of 60% of points 
at least once after 1995 (Bosman Verdict); Graph 5 depicts the clubs that ex-
ceeded the benchmark at least once before Bosman, measured by a three-year 
moving average to even out possible lucky punches. The benchmark was cho-
sen empirically since it seems to be the point where the elite of the league cuts 
itself off from the rest of the field. In Graph 4, one can see that, especially after 
1995, successful clubs established themselves on a constantly high level of 
success. Graph 5, on the contrary, is evidence that being successful before 
Bosman had no real long lasting effect. And as mentioned before, after 1995, 
more than one club took part in the CL, which decreased the impact of the 
advantage relative to other successful clubs within the nation league. Overall, 
though, one can say that the same clubs are being successful. In combination 
with the decreasing competitive balance, this is a strong indicator for the validi-
ty of Hypothesis 1 and the interaction of the hypotheses. 
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Graph 4: Top Clubs after 1995 
 
Graph 5: Top Clubs before 1995 
 
 
Turning to the Champions League, Graph 6 shows the number of clubs over 
their number of appearances in the CL over the whole time of the competition. 
More than 30% of the clubs that ever played in the CL only appeared once on 
the international level. Relatively only a few clubs play in Europe’s top leagues 
quite often. The distribution is an indicator that some clubs established them-
selves on the international level, while the great majority only gets to play 
every once in a while. 
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Graph 6: Frequency of Champions League Appearances 
 
 
Graph 7 shows the success of all those clubs that appeared only once, while 
Graph 8 depicts the success of the top twenty clubs in regard to appearance. 
The latter do not only appear more often – they are also very much more suc-
cessful when they play. Those aspects in combination support Hypothesis 2. If 
frequently clubs would win that only attend the international level with the 
smallest frequency of appearances, then Hypothesis 2 loses credibility, but 
indeed none of those clubs ever won. Compared to the top twenty in attend-
ance, their success rate is rather low. 
Graph 7: Success in the Champions League with a Single Appearance 
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Graph 8: Success in the Champions League with Recurring Appearances 
 
 
Graph 9: Aggregated Success in the Champions League of Top 5 National 
Leagues 
 
 
Lastly, to evaluate the credibility of Hypothesis 3, the success of national 
leagues is considered. Graph 9 shows the aggregated success of teams of the 
same nationality of the six most successful leagues. Looking at the results, the 
first noticeable aspect is that the range of aggregated success by nations in-
creases drastically. This can be explained by changes in the system of the tour-
nament. After 1995, more than one club per league (up to four) could partici-
pate in the tournament. This produced very clear winning nations. Those are 
the biggest and strongest leagues in Europe. It is thus less surprising that those 
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leagues are continuously successful on a much higher level than other leagues. 
Graph 10 depicts six leagues which are exemplary for the remaining leagues on 
the continent that did not profit from any changes. This supports Hypothesis 3 
that also leagues in Europe are drifting apart concerning success. 
Graph 10: Aggregated Success in the Champions League of Examples for other  
 National Leagues 
 
 
To conclude this chapter, all the statistical evidence is in support of the hy-
potheses. More importantly there are no results in contradiction lending them 
credence. 
9.   Qualitative Approach 
We didn’t underestimate them. They were just a lot better than we thought. 
Bobby Robson 
The statistical evidence supports the hypotheses’ validity. However, to get a 
better insight into the mechanisms, a qualitative approach is necessary. I will 
thus use process tracing heuristically to do precisely this. The method will be 
used as a heuristic device only because the mechanisms do not necessarily 
present themselves as processes. So at this point the main argument of theory-
testing process-tracing to evaluate “whether the hypothesized mechanism was 
present in the case” (Beach and Pedersen 2003, 14) is the baseline for the em-
pirical procedure. I will thus map out the selected issue and present evidence 
for the theoretical aspects concerning the relevant mechanism. 
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9.1  Case Selection 
As for the case selection, a crucial case is to be selected. Even though the here-
proposed methodology is not entirely in line with Lieberman’s model of a 
mixed-method strategy, his argument concerning case selection also holds for 
this design: “[T]he primary goal is to assess the strength of a particular model. 
As such, there is little value to the pursuit of cases that are not well predicted 
by the model” (2005, 444). 
Additional to this the case should be concerning the aspects of path depend-
ence regarding power, since this mechanism is hard to grasp through mere data 
analysis. Another important aspect is the fact that the study does not strictly fit 
the criteria of a “case.” The term here is rather in regard to an important singu-
lar event series that allows to elaborating on path dependence in terms of power 
testing the implication of mechanisms in a specific setting. 
The case I will investigate is the restructuring of distribution of broadcasting 
revenues in the German Bundesliga. This case is especially interesting because 
it touches upon nearly all theoretical arguments. As the DFL argued against the 
Commission, it is supposed to be the main element of solidarity in the BL 
reflecting the collective action problem and referring to the European vision on 
the special role of sports and especially football. Furthermore, as the Commis-
sion was already involved in regulating the field, it is a case where the political 
sphere on EU level is relevant. 
Looking at the BL as a national case is not a problem concerning the thesis 
that European football is subject to path dependence. This is true for two rea-
sons: on the one hand, the theoretical part showed that the mechanisms are 
analogues throughout all levels. Even though a generalization is methodologi-
cally not possible, the case represents, as mentioned, all the important aspects 
from clubs’ incentives to different types of bargaining power. On the other 
hand, this article’s contribution is in regard to the EU’s vision of sports. As the 
mechanisms interact from a national to the European level, solving the fairness 
issues on national levels would certainly translate at least to some degree into 
fairness on the international level. 
9.2  Broadcasting Revenues in the German Bundesliga 
Before 2001, revenues generated through the collective selling of broadcasting 
rights were distributed evenly between the members of the DFL. In 2001, the 
allocation formula was changed. I will first give an overview of the relevant 
venue responsible for the change, namely the Deutsche Fußball-Bund (DFB) and 
the DFL. I will demonstrate that, within the structure of those organizations, there 
is no constitutional bias towards powerful clubs. Since this is the case, other 
mechanisms have to be responsible for the change. After elaborating on the 
change itself, I will thus recapitulate the theoretical implications of path de-
pendence concerning power and present evidence for that particular case. 
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The DFB was founded in 1900 and survived both World Wars before it cre-
ated the Bundesliga in 1963. At first, the DFB was mainly a coordinating or-
ganization, but with the increasing professionalization and economization, it 
developed into the major – and for a long time only – governance body of 
German football. The main objective of the DFB, according to its statutes, is to 
organize gaming operations in a sustainable manner and to secure the integrity 
of competition by undertaking all necessary measure towards fair competition 
(Satzung des DFB, §§4, 5). Members of the DFB are the various Landes- and 
Regionalverbände (football associations on the state and regional level) as well 
as the DFL. The DFB works on the basis of rather conventional democratic 
criteria (see Satzung des DFB, §26). Since votes are not cast by individual 
clubs but by sub-associations, which are by themselves diverse, single clubs 
have no special structural leverage within the DFB. 
The DFL has only been in the picture since 2001. Contrary to the state or 
regional associations, its membership is not bound by geographical criteria. 
The DFL represents the clubs of the first and second German Bundesliga, 
which are the two highest leagues in German football. The foundation of the 
DFL reflects another sign for power mechanisms since it was promoted by the 
powerful clubs in Germany to gain independence from the interests of amateur 
clubs (Kruse and Quitzau 2003, 13). However, since the broadcasting revenues 
distribution in essence affects only clubs who are members of DFL, this is just 
an interesting side note. In any case, as a member of the DFB, the DFL is 
bound by the above-mentioned DFB statutes. But also the DFL statutes postu-
late fairness. The DFL aims to stabilize competitive capacity of its members 
and financial fair play (DFL Politik und Zielsetzung, 1 et seq.). However, the 
DFL is a limited liability company and is thus only accountable to its own rules 
of procedure. The DFL markets the Bundesliga broadcasting rights and, togeth-
er with its corporate parent Die Liga (The League), which functions similar to 
the DFL (see Ligastatut), decides on the distribution formula. 
This distribution formula changed drastically in 2001. Until then, revenues 
were redistributed almost evenly between clubs of the DFL. This reflected the 
principle of solidarity. However, looking at the drafting system in most US 
sports, one could claim that an inversely proportionate distribution would be 
fair. In most US leagues, the worst team has the first choice when it comes to 
new players. An inversely proportionate distribution would be the analogy in 
European football. 
The new distribution, however, goes in the direct opposite direction and is 
now according to the so called spray criteria of 2:1. This means that success is 
now a major criterion, but the maximum share and the minimum share must not 
exceed the ratio of 2:1. Nowadays this translates into 5.8% of revenues for the 
champion and 2.9% for the worst club. It shall be noted that the DFL still frames 
this as complying with the principle of solidarity (DFL press release 2012). 
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The reproductive mechanism concerning changing the rules of the game on 
an operational level is increasing returns based on bargaining power regarding 
hypothetical exit options on football institutions or on particular issues on the 
EU level. Both were given when it comes to the changes in 2001. 
In 2000, fourteen European football clubs, among them Bayern München 
and Borussia Dortmund, two German clubs (shortly after Bayer Leverkusen 
followed), founded the G14. The G14 was essentially a “lobby group on behalf 
of the mainly commercial (common) interests of leading European clubs” 
(Brand and Niemann 2011, 13). It was the first time that European clubs 
formed an independent organization on a European level generating credibility 
on the threat of a European break-away league of Europe’s top clubs. They 
demonstrated that clubs can organize themselves without existing associations. 
The hypothetical exit option with all its consequences thus became very appar-
ent to the old-established associations posing a real threat to the existing sys-
tem, and giving powerful clubs leverage on all levels. 
The G14 even opened an office in Brussels bringing the EU level into the 
picture. As shown above, the EU had intervened in joint and collective selling 
in reference to competition law. The principle of solidarity was not a valid argu-
ment in the eyes of the Commission. This lead Uli Hoeneß, one of the persons in 
authority at Bayern München (Germany’s most powerful club), to say that if the 
smaller teams should consider an agreement, ignoring the interests of the big 
clubs, where the distribution formula remains based on equal shares they would 
go before the ECJ to sue for the decentralized marketing of broadcasting rights 
(cited in Ballasch 2009, 19). Considering the Commission’s previous stands on 
the issue disregarding the principle of solidarity in this particular matter and 
previous ECJ decisions, there was a real perspective of success again strength-
ening the leverage of big clubs. This is also because there are European leagues 
that already have decentralized systems like England, Spain, or Italy, which in 
itself undermines solidarity because successful clubs generate more revenues 
when marketing is decentralized (Brand and Niemann 2011, 11). 
To summarize: There are no structural advantages for clubs within the DFL 
to influence decisions. Smaller clubs, which pose the majority in the DFL, had 
no interest in changing the distribution formula to their disadvantage. But, due 
to the organization of G14 and an open promising channel through EU institu-
tions, the big clubs had enough leverage to change the system anyway by 
threating to make it worse for smaller clubs either through a new European 
league or by introducing decentralized marketing in reference to European law. 
In conclusion, the aspects that foster increasing returns are very much present 
in this particular case. 
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10.  Conclusion 
The ball is round and the game lasts 90 minutes.  
Sepp Herberger 
Football is the single most popular sport for Europeans. The central theses of 
this contribution is that path-dependent mechanisms on all levels render the 
sport to a development in which success causes success through success itself, 
and through money and power. 
The processes are not independent from the European political arena. On the 
contrary, the EU, and especially the ECJ and the Commission, have interfered 
in the system frequently. This happened rather unguided and on the basis of 
laws that did not take into account the special characteristics of sport. In the 
grand scheme of things, the EU has only recently developed a clear vision of 
sport. However the field is still rather ambiguous. This and former decisions by 
the Commission and the ECJ have lead European football on a path contrary to 
the EU’s ideas in regard to its social purpose. 
I have developed path dependence towards a more analytical approach to 
grasp that path. Reproductive mechanisms are the main causes for an increas-
ing stability of “unfairness” in the system of European football. 
Furthermore, I have shown that these mechanisms exist all throughout Eu-
ropean football. So far, there are no aspects in the sport that would counter its 
reproductive mechanism. 
The statistical evidence I have presented supports the theses and the theory 
with its hypotheses. Indeed, successful clubs become more successful and 
Europe concerning football is drifting apart in terms of success. The qualitative 
approach has shown that in the case of the distribution formula on broadcasting 
revenues the hypothesized mechanism was present. 
However, the empirical evidence presented in this contribution only takes a 
glimpse at a full analysis of reproductive mechanisms. Future research should 
include a bigger data set including all of Europe’s first and second leagues, as 
well as the Champions League and the UEFA Europa League. Another angle 
would be more qualitative research to get further insight into the mechanisms 
of reproduction especially when it comes to power. Expanding the theoretical 
approach towards other types of sport especially in regard to EU interventions 
could be beneficial. 
Lastly, to build the bridge back to the EU, it became apparent that the EU-
interventions are contradictory to its newly formed vision on sport. If the Euro-
pean Union is serious about its vision, it has to implement the special character-
istics of sport into a coherent policy approach that not only intervenes in foot-
ball’s reproductive mechanism but also corrects former decisions that have led 
to uncertainty for almost all actors involved. At times, as was shown this even 
strengthens the development of “unfairness.” 
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